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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Eventi DIAG
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DTSTART:20161030T030000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
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DTSTART:20160327T020000
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UID:calendar.7343.field_data.0@diag.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20201123T222952Z
CREATED:20160711T123835Z
DESCRIPTION:From 14:00 to 14:25:TITLE: Equilibria for semi-infinite program
mingSPEAKER: Giancarlo Bigi (Dipartimento di Informatica\, Università di P
isa)ABSTRACT: Bilevel optimization\, noncooperative games and semi-infinit
e programming share some similarities\, which may lead to meaningful conne
ctions. Indeed\, theoretical developments and algorithms developed for one
of these models could be exploited to cope with the others. In this talk
we focus on the relationships between generalized Nash games and semi-infi
nite programming. In particular\, we show how generalized Nash games can b
e exploited to solve semi-infinite programs with convex-concave constraint
s\, relying on penalization techniques and a sequence of suitable saddlepo
int problems.From 14:30 to 14:55:TITLE: A bridge between bilevel programs
and Nash gamesSPEAKER: Lorenzo Lampariello (Dipartimento di Studi Aziendal
i\, Università degli Studi Roma Tre)ABSTRACT: We study connections between
bilevel programming problems and Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (G
NEP). We provide a complete analysis of the relationship between the verti
cal bilevel problem and the corresponding horizontal one-level GNEP. We de
fine classes of problems for which solutions of the bilevel program can be
computed by finding equilibria of the GNEP. Our study provides the theore
tical backbone and the main ideas uderlying some useful novel algorithmic
developments.From 15:00 to 15:25:TITLE: A single-level approach to multi-l
eader-follower gamesSPEAKER: Simone Sagratella (Dipartimento di Ingegneria
Informatica Automatica Gestionale\, Sapienza Università di Roma)ABSTRACT:
Multi-Leader Common-Follower games (MLCF) are a powerful modelling tool t
o study complex bilevel systems arising for example in electricity markets
. Leveraging the optimal value approach\, we introduce a Generalized Nash
Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) model based on the first order approximation of
follower’s value function. This single-level GNEP is closely related to t
he original MLCF. We show that any KKT point of (a suitably perturbed vers
ion of the) former problem is critical for (an approximate) MLCF. Moreover
\, we define wide classes of problems for which the vice-versa holds as we
ll.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20160712T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20160712T140000
LAST-MODIFIED:20190805T155749Z
LOCATION:Aula A5 DIAG-Sapienza\, Via Ariosto 25\, Roma
SUMMARY:Bilevel Programs and Nash games - Giancarlo Bigi\, Lorenzo Lamparie
llo\, Simone Sagratella
URL;TYPE=URI:http://diag.uniroma1.it/node/7343
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