We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This infrastructure relies on hardware performance counters to collect information at runtime from all applications running on the machine. High-level detection metrics are derived from these measurements to maximize the likelihood of promptly detecting a malicious application. Our experimental assessment shows that we can catch a large family of side-channel attacks with a significantly reduced overhead. We also discuss countermeasures that can be enacted once a process is suspected of carrying out a side-channel attack to increase the overall tradeoff between the system’s security level and the delivered performance under non-suspected process executions.
2022, DIGITAL THREATS, Pages -
Fight Hardware with Hardware: System-wide Detection and Mitigation of Side-Channel Attacks using Performance Counters (01a Articolo in rivista)
Carna' Stefano, Ferracci Serena, Quaglia Francesco, Pellegrini Alessandro