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Seminario pubblico di Riccardo Marzano

Speaker: 
Riccardo Marzano
Data dell'evento: 
Lunedì, 25 Maggio, 2020 - 09:00
Luogo: 
https://meet.google.com/xhb-xzsw-wqf
Contatto: 
alberto.nastasi@uniroma1.it

In ottemperanza ai requisiti previsti dalla procedura selettiva per n.1 posto di Ricercatore a tempo determinato - Tipologia B SC 09/B3 SSD ING-IND/35 - Dipartimento di Ingegneria Informatica Automatica e Gestionale "A. Ruberti", Codice bando: 2019RTDB006, lunedì 25 maggio 2020, alle ore 9:00, in modalità telematica si terrà il seminario di Riccardo Marzano sulle sue attività di ricerca svolte e in corso di svolgimento.

Per partecipare, connettersi all’indirizzo: https://meet.google.com/xhb-xzsw-wqf

 

Descrizione
Riccardo Marzano, vincitore di procedura selettiva di chiamata per un posto di Ricercatore a tempo determinato - Tipologia B per il Settore Concorsuale 09/B3 – Settore scientifico disciplinare ING-IND/35, terrà un seminario su attività di ricerca svolte e in corso di svolgimento. Il seminario avrà luogo lunedì 25 maggio 2020 alle ore 9:00 in modalità telematica (indirizzo: https://meet.google.com/xhb-xzsw-wqf)

 


Title: Antitrust and firm behavior

Abstract:  I will give a talk about my recent research on the interplay between antitrust policy and firm behavior. Firstly, I will present the results of an investigation as to how corporate ownership shapes the firms’ likelihood of being involved in antitrust indictments. Using data from Italy, I will show that family firms are significantly less likely than other firms to commit antitrust violations. Family firms are especially less likely to commit antitrust violations when they feature a more prominent size relative to the city where they are located, which magnifies reputational concerns. Moreover, family firms involved in antitrust violations appoint more family members in top executive positions in the aftermath of the indictment, invest less and curb equity financing as compared to nonfamily firms. Collectively, findings suggest that family control wards off reputational damages but, at the same time, it weakens the ability to expand in order to keep up with fiercer competition following the dismantlement of the anticompetitive practice. Secondly, I will discuss the relationship between antitrust enforcement in a country and its attractiveness to MNEs. Using a sample of 63 countries, followed in the 1980-2017 period, I will show that the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement is a key factor in attracting FDI, but only in host countries characterized by institutional configurations where the lack of trust is concomitant with a high-quality pro-market institutional environment.

 

 
Short Bio: Riccardo Marzano, Ph.D in Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering at Politecnico di Milano, is Assistant Professor at Sapienza University of Rome. His research interests cover industrial organization and the economics of industrial and institutional dynamics. His current research focuses on ownership and corporate governance mechanisms and their interaction with the institutional variety as drivers of firm’s internationalization strategies. He is also interested in energy & water economics and policy. Riccardo has participated in scientific projects promoted by private and public institutions, such the European Commission and the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment. He has published in international journals such as Journal of International Business Studies, Global Strategy Journal, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Cleaner Production and others.

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